Problem of Evil & Suffering
Logical and evidential arguments from evil, and Christian theodicy.
The Case
Evil is the hardest honest objection to Christianity, and it deserves a real answer rather than a defensive one. That's what the historic Christian tradition actually offers. The problem comes in two distinct forms, and conflating them causes most of the confusion around this topic. The logical problem argues that God's omnipotence, omniscience, and perfect goodness are strictly incompatible with the existence of any evil at all. The evidential problem is weaker but harder to dismiss: it argues that the amount and severity of suffering in the world, even if not logically incompatible with God's existence, counts as strong evidence against it.
The logical version is generally regarded as settled, and not in the skeptic's favor. Alvin Plantinga's free will defense is accepted even by J. L. Mackie, the atheist philosopher who originated the modern logical argument, as having defused it: it's possible that a world with free creatures capable of real moral good requires the possibility of real moral evil too. The evidential version is where the live debate actually is today, and Christian philosophy has substantive, actively defended answers to it, engaged directly below rather than conceded.
None of this requires pretending suffering doesn't hurt, or that every answer is fully satisfying on an emotional level. Christian philosophers themselves don't agree on which response to suffering carries the most weight, particularly for what philosophers call 'horrendous evils,' atrocities so severe that no ordinary greater-good explanation feels adequate. That honest disagreement, covered in Where Christians Disagree, is a sign of a tradition still doing real intellectual work on hard cases, not a tradition without an answer.
Common Arguments
The Free Will Defense
Alvin Plantinga argues it's possible that a world containing free creatures capable of real moral good requires the genuine possibility of moral evil. If so, God's existence isn't logically incompatible with evil, even if evil remains a real problem in other ways.
Strongest challenge: The defense is aimed at moral evil (evil caused by free agents) and does much less work against natural evil: disease, earthquakes, animal suffering, none of which is obviously a byproduct of anyone's free choices.
Why it holds: Plantinga's own broader defense extends to natural evil too: it's possible that some or all natural evil traces back to the free choices of non-human agents (a line with roots in historic Christian angelology). A defense only needs to show a scenario is possible, not actually true, to defeat a claim of logical incompatibility, so it succeeds at its actual target. What natural evil really presses on is the evidential problem, addressed on its own terms next.
The Evidential Problem of Evil
William Rowe argues that at least some instances of intense suffering appear utterly pointless, serving no greater good an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being couldn't have secured some other way, and that this counts as genuine evidence against God's existence, whether or not it's a strict logical contradiction.
Strongest challenge: The argument depends on a premise that's hard to verify: that we'd probably be able to recognize a God-justifying reason for a given evil if one existed. Skeptical theism (below) directly challenges that assumption.
Why it holds: That dependence is exactly where the argument runs into trouble, as skeptical theism spells out next: finite minds have no good track record of reliably judging what an infinite mind could or couldn't have a reason for, which means 'I can't see the point of this evil' is much weaker evidence against God than the argument needs it to be.
Skeptical Theism
Stephen Wykstra argues that finite human minds have no good reason to expect they'd discern God's reasons for permitting a specific evil even if such reasons exist. Our failure to see a justifying reason, in other words, isn't strong evidence that none exists.
Strongest challenge: Critics, including some theists, worry the same reasoning proves too much: if we can't trust our sense that a given evil looks pointless, it's unclear why we should trust other intuitions the argument for God's existence sometimes leans on either.
Why it holds: The 'proves too much' worry conflates two different kinds of intuition. Skeptical theism only targets our ability to judge God's reasons for a specific, unexplained event, a claim about the limits of our access to a mind vastly beyond ours, not our ordinary moral intuitions about right and wrong or the philosophical intuitions behind arguments like fine-tuning, which don't require reading God's specific purposes at all. The objection targets a much broader skepticism than skeptical theism actually claims.
Horrendous Evils and Christian Response
Marilyn McCord Adams argues traditional 'greater good' theodicies inadequately address horrendous evils that engulf an individual life (genocide, torture, the sexual abuse of a child), and offers a specifically Christian response centered on God's identification with suffering in the crucifixion and its ultimate defeat rather than a tidy justification.
Strongest challenge: Because the response draws on specifically Christian theological resources (the incarnation, the cross, final restoration) rather than general philosophical argument, it offers comfort within the Christian framework more than it functions as a persuasive answer for someone who doesn't already accept that framework.
Why it holds: That's arguably a strength rather than a weakness. Purely philosophical theodicies try to justify horrendous evil from the outside, in the abstract, which can feel hollow next to actual suffering. Christianity's answer is that God didn't stay outside it. He entered it, in the crucifixion, a suffering foretold in Isaiah 53:3–5's portrait of a suffering servant, and that specifically Christian resource is what other philosophical traditions don't have available to them at all. A worldview that can point to God suffering alongside us is answering the problem of evil in a way a merely abstract argument cannot.
The Soul-Making (Irenaean) Theodicy
Drawing on the early church father Irenaeus, John Hick argues God deliberately created humanity at an epistemic distance from himself, in a world with real dangers and hardships, because moral and spiritual character can only be freely developed through facing genuine difficulty, not instilled ready-made. Suffering is the raw material of a 'soul-making' process, not a design flaw.
Strongest challenge: The theodicy struggles to explain suffering that destroys rather than builds character (a child's suffering that ends in death before any 'soul-making' can occur, for instance), and critics ask why an omnipotent God couldn't achieve the same character development with less or gentler hardship.
Why it holds: Hick's own answer leans on an eschatological horizon this life alone doesn't show: soul-making doesn't have to complete in this life to be real, if there's a life beyond it in which unfinished growth continues and every apparently wasted suffering is ultimately taken up into a good end. As for gentler hardship, a world with only trivial difficulty couldn't build the specific virtues, courage, sacrificial love, perseverance, that depend on the stakes being genuinely real.
The Felix Culpa ("Fortunate Fall") Theodicy
Alvin Plantinga argues a world containing the incarnation and atonement (God himself entering creation to defeat sin and suffering from within) may be a better world overall than any world without sin, evil, or a fall to redeem, even though it's a worse world in the interim. On this view, God permits the fall because the redeemed world it makes possible is of surpassing value, echoing Paul's claim in Romans 5:20 that 'where sin increased, grace increased all the more.'
Strongest challenge: Critics, including Marilyn McCord Adams, question whether the sheer scale and horror of actual evils (not evil in the abstract) is really necessary to reach that surpassing good, or whether the argument proves at most that some evil serves this purpose, not that this much evil does.
Why it holds: Plantinga's argument doesn't require proving this exact quantity of evil was strictly necessary. It only requires that a world including the fall, the incarnation, and the atonement could rival or exceed the value of every possible sin-free world, which is enough to block the claim that God's goodness is straightforwardly incompatible with the evil we actually see. Combined with the free will defense above, it shifts the burden back onto the critic to show no such surpassing good is even possible, a much harder claim to establish than it looks.
Where Christians Disagree
Internal critiques and areas of legitimate debate, so this topic isn't presented as more settled than it is.
Do Christian philosophers even agree on the right kind of response to suffering? Some emphasize 'greater good' theodicies that try to explain why God permits specific evils (Plantinga's free will defense is one example).
Others lean on skeptical theism instead, arguing we shouldn't expect to identify God's specific reasons at all. The two sit in some tension with each other (a full theodicy and a skeptical-theist defense of why we can't have one aren't quite the same move), and serious Christian philosophers favor each.
Did animal suffering and physical death exist before a historical Fall, or did they enter creation only as its consequence? Traditional readings tie all natural evil to Adam's sin.
Christians who accept the standard scientific timescale for the earth (see Science & Faith) generally hold that animal death and suffering long predate humanity, which requires a different theological account of natural evil rather than one rooted in a single historical event that changed nature itself.
If God is perfectly good and loving, how can he permit any person to suffer eternal conscious torment in hell? Traditionalists like Jerry Walls point to texts like Matthew 25:46 and argue eternal separation from God is the just and freely chosen consequence of persistently rejecting him, and remains compatible with God's goodness.
Christian universalists like Thomas Talbott lean on passages like 1 Timothy 2:4, that God 'desires all people to be saved,' to argue his love is inescapable enough that he will eventually reconcile every person to himself, while annihilationists hold the unrepentant are ultimately destroyed rather than tormented forever. All three positions have committed, orthodox defenders arguing from Scripture and philosophy, and none is treated as heresy by the mainstream of every tradition that holds it. This remains one of the most consequential live disagreements in Christian theology.